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Criminal Law-Appeal by StateDouble Jeopardy*
The United States Constitution assures to the people the safeguard against double jeopardy: "nor shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . ... "'

The New Mexico Constitution contains a similar provision: "nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ....-2
The doctrine of double jeopardy has been gradually developed
and refined by the courts since it was first placed in the United
States Constitution, as well as most state constitutions. The typical
common law rationale for the doctrine is:
The State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity . . . . Thus it is one of the elemental principles of our

criminal law that the Government cannot secure a new trial by
means of an appeal even though an acquittal may appear to be
4
erroneous.

As this language is generally understood, the state or federal
government has no right to an appeal unless expressly conferred
by a statute.' In New Mexico the State Criminal Code allows the

prosecution only a limited right to appeal in certain criminal cases:
"The state shall only be allowed an appeal or writ of error in
criminal cases where an indictment, complaint or information is
quashed, or adjudged insufficient upon an interlocutory motion,
or judgment is arrested." 6 The statute lacks, however, any provision allowing the state an appeal upon a question of law reserved
at the trial. It is the purpose of this Comment to suggest that such
* N.M. Const. art. 2, § 15; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-15-3 (Repl. 1964).
1. U.S. Const. amend. V. § 1.
2. N.M. Const. art. 2, § 15. "The words 'same offense' mean same offense, not
the same transaction, not the same acts, not the same circumstances or same situation."
State v. Rose, 89 Ohio St. 383, 106 N.E. 50, 51 (1914). Quoted with approval by
New Mexico Supreme Court in State v. Goodson, 54 N.M. 184, 217 P.2d 262 (1950).
3. U.S. Const. amend. V, § 1; N.M. Const. art. 2, § 15; Okla. Const. art. 2, § 21;
Tex. Const. art. 1, § 14; Wash. Const. art. 1, § 9; Wis. Const. art. 1, § 8; 21 Am.
Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 166 n. 7 (1965).
4. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184., 187 (1957).
5. United States v. Rosenwasser, 145 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1944); People v. White,
364 I1. 574, 5 N.E.2d 472 (1936) ; City of Clovis v. Curry, 33 N.M. 222, 264 Pac.
956 (1928) ; People v. Moon, 257 App. Div. 1019, 12 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1939).
6. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-15-3 (Repl. 1964).
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a provision would be a valuable and desirable addition to the State
Criminal Code. The New Mexico Constitution would not necessarily prohibit a statute allowing the state to appeal. Although the
overwhelming authority is that in the absence of statute no appeal
lies to the state for error, states having constitutional provisions
similar to that of New Mexico 7 have held that a statute allowing
the state to appeal in a criminal case does not violate such a
provision. 8
Nor would the United States Constitution prohibit a state
appeals statute. This question was answered by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut.9 The issue before the court was
whether the Connecticut statute allowing state appeals' ° denied the
defendant due process of law as required by the fourteenth amendment. In upholding the Connecticut legislation the opinion held that
the state can have rights of appeal equal to those of the defendant
without violating due process. Mr. Justice Cardozo concluded by
saying: "The edifice of justice stands, its symmetry, to many,
greater than before."" Although the opinion stated that the fifth
amendment prohibition against double jeopardy was not applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment, more recent
cases that have broadened the concept of due process indicate that
the provision may very well apply to the states. 12 It is the position
of this Comment, however, that the allowance of an appeal to the
state after acquittal does not create a situation of true double
7. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
8. For example, in State v. Witte, 243 Wis. 423, 10 N.W.2d 117 (1943), the
court sustained the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. Ann. § 358.12(8) (1941), which
provides that "a writ of error may be taken by and on behalf of the state in
criminal cases .. .from rulings and decisions adverse to the state upon all questions
of law arising on the trial . . . in the same manner and to the same effect as if
taken by the defendant." The court expressly held that Wis. Const. art. 1, § 8, which
states that "no person for the same offense shall be put twice in jeopardy of punishment," was not violated by the statute.. Also, in State v. Brunn, 22 Wash. 2d 120,
154 P.2d 826 (1945), the court held a state appeal statute to be a valid enactment
and not in violation of the state constitution providing that no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense. The court reasoned that a new trial, on
application of the defendant or the state, is not a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense, but is a continuation of the original prosecution.
There is, however, a difference of opinion in some other jurisdictions. See,' e.g.,
State v. Gates, 63 Ohio 137, 25 N.E.2d 471 (1939).
9. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
10' Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.. § 54-96 (Supp. 1965). See text accompanying note 29
infra.
11. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
12. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) ; United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S.
463 (1964) ; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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jeopardy 3s which may in fact be prohibited to the states in light
of the Supreme Court's conception of the fourteenth amendment.
The discussion will be limited to the situation in which the same
offense is reprosecuted within a single jurisdiction. No attempt will
be made to analyze the problems of the split offense, 14 premature
termination, 15 conviction of a lesser included offense,' 6 multiple
prosecution by overlapping jurisdictions,' 7 or multiple indictments
based on different legal theories for a single criminal act.1 s
Early English law furnishes a valuable background for considering the American concept of double jeopardy. Some courts have
said it is impossible to find the origin of the doctrine; in the opinion
of one court, it has "simply always existed."'
Whether double jeopardy has always existed or not, the phrase
"jeopardy of life or limb" had a very literal meaning in early
English law. Death or mutilation awaited those accused of almost
any crime from petty larceny 2 to homicide. 2 ' Moreover, defendants
were at a great disadvantage in criminal courts; they were not
allowed counsel, witnesses, nor the right to testify on their own
behalf. 22 Eventually, however, the unreasonable severity of criminal
laws, and the oppression suffered by accused persons generally, led
13. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
14. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958) (one act may be directed at
several persons, the question is whether each person injured is a separate criminal
act).
15. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904) (a trial is stopped short of its
final termination) ; United States v. Whitlow, 110 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C. 1953).
16. State v. Welch, 37 N.M. 549, 25 P.2d 211 (1933) (a situation in which the
defendant appeals a conviction and is later convicted of a greater offense, or is
convicted on other counts not contained in the original indictment).
17. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). See also Grant, Penal Ordinances and the Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy, 25 Geo. L.J. 293 (1937). (Overlapping jurisdictional boundaries may cause the same action to be tried again as an
offense of a different kind, or against a different sovereign. E.g., civil-criminal,
federal-state, civilian-military, or foreign-domestic.)
18. State v. Quintana, 69 N.M. 51, 364 P.2d 120 (1961) ; Gore v. United States,
357 U.S. 386 (1958). See also Horack, The Multiple Consequences of a Single
Criminal Act, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 805 (1937) (defendant is tried once and later tried
again for offenses "arising out of the same transaction," although the new charges are
technically different from the original charges).
19. Stout v. State, 36 Okla. 744, 130 Pac. 553, 558 (1913).
20. 2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law 497 (2d ed. 1959).
21. Id. at 452.
22. 1 Wigmore, Evidence 994 (2d ed. 1923). The year 1702 was the earliest an
accused was allowed to have witnesses in his own behalf. Not until 1837 were felons
allowed counsel, and they could not testify in their own behalf until 1898. Plucknett,
Concise History of the Common Law 423 (4th ed. 1948).
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to the development of rules designed to alleviate the hardships
23
placed upon the defendant.
Denial of a state right to appeal is usually based upon this
argument of hardship to the defendant.24 It is true that the delay
involved in an appeal and perhaps a new trial would subject an
accused to both economic and psychological hardships. This argument seems persuasive, particularly if the defendant is innocent and
indigent. Society does not seem to mind, however, if an unwilling
and blameless defendant is harrassed by his adversary in a civil
case. He can be taken to any court in which his opponent can show
that he has a claim.2 5
This objection can be easily overcome in several ways: criminal
appeals could be advanced on the court docket; 26 special criminal
divisions could be established; the time to bring an appeal could be
shortened; and, the defendant could be released on his own recognizance.2 7 The defendant's expenses could also be borne by the state,
just as it does now in the case of an indigent defendant.
Admitting that a defendant should not be twice put in jeopardy,
the question arises whether a defendant is ever placed in jeopardy
when there is reversible error in the proceedings. Whether there
was substantial error at the trial can only be determined by an
appeal. If the appellate court finds that substantial error exists, a
new trial is in order. The second trial would not be another trial
for the same offense; it would be a continuation of the same trial,
the first trial not being complete until it is tried correctly.2 8
23. Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 Am. J. Legal Hist. 283 (1963).
24. E.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). See text accompanying
note 4 supra.
25. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
26. This is already done in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Morse v. United States,
168 Fed. 49 (2d Cir. 1909), where the defendant's case was placed ahead of other
litigants and argued before the trial court record and briefs were printed.
27. Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 Yale L.J., 486, 501 (1927).
The author points out that the defendant, if released on his own recognizance pending
appeal by the state, would be no freer than he is now following complete discharge.
If the judgment were reversed, he could be rearrested.
28. 10 ALI Proceedings 130, 131 (1932) :
[W]hen the state appeals, and the Supreme Court sees error was made in
the trial of the case to the prejudice of the state, the judge ruling erroneously
on questions of law or evidence, the case has never been tried according to
rules of law and is not finally settled until it is so tried. They send it back
to be tried in accordance with the principles of law, and this second trial
is not another trial of the defendant for the same offense. It is a part of the
same trial of the defendant for the same offense, the first trial not being
a final and complete trial until it has been tried correctly.
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Connecticut has taken this position by enacting a statute which
allows the state as broad a right of appeal as that of the defendant.
The state may appeal an acquittal just as the defendant may appeal
a conviction:
Appeals from the rulings and decisions of the superior court, upon
all questions of law arising on the trial of criminal cases, may be
taken by the state, with the permission of the presiding judge, to the
supreme court, in the
same manner and to the same effect as if
29
made by the accused.
In holding the statute valid, the Connecticut court said:
The end is not reached, the cause is not finished, until both the
facts, and the law applicable to the facts, are finally determined.
A final settlement is not more vital than a right settlement.
The same underlying principle of justice which demands a retrial
because a juror is legally disqualified calls for a retrial when illegal
evidence has been admitted or legal evidence excluded. In either
case the trial is tainted, and should not support a final judgment.30
The same reasoning is relied upon in the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Holmes in Kepner v. United States"1 in which he made
the argument that an appeal by the state to procure a new trial
would be continuing jeopardy beginning and ending in the same
case. He said that "logically and rationally a man cannot be said
to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause, however often
he may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy from its
beginning to the end of the cause."
The desirability of the Connecticut rule and the unfortunate
result of the majority rule is apparent when one realizes what the
majority rule actually stands for: when the trial favors the accused,
the proceeding is conclusive; when it favors the state, it is not
conclusive. "Stated thus baldly, the proposition is an amazing
2
one."3

In addition to the necessity of one fair, complete trial for the
accused, there is also the need for state appeals in order to properly
develop the state criminal law. Denial of state appeals forces a
one-sided development because the state is never heard at the
29. Conn. Gen. State. Ann. § 54-96 (Supp. 1965). The present statute is substantially the same as the original act enacted in 1886. Conn. Pub. Acts 1886, at 560.
30. State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 At. 1110 (1894).
31. 195 U.S. 128, 134 (1904) (dissenting opinion).
32. Miller, supra note 27, at 496.
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appellate level. In New Mexico and other states in which appeal by
the state is not allowed, no record is ever made in the appellate
court upon trial court errors prejudicial to the prosecution. Since
the state does not have the right of appeal, questions of law which
are decided against the people cannot be reviewed by the appellate
court."3 The trial court therefore becomes the final arbiter for
questions of law concerning the prosecution. Development of the
criminal law will necessarily be irregular and one-sided as long
as the state is denied an equal right to appeal.
Moreover, although the present rule denying the state an appeal
purports to prevent undue harrassment of the individual, it may in
practice do just the opposite. The multitude of statutory offenses
which can be ascribed to a single criminal transaction may be an
indication of the states' desire to be assured of convictions. If a
defendant is acquitted of one offense, the state may secure a future
conviction under another statutory provision. 4 For example, if
several persons are robbed at the same time, the accused may be
tried separately for the robbery of each. In Abbate v. United
States,35 Mr. Justice Brennan in a separate opinion said:
Obviously separate prosecutions of the same criminal conduct can
be far more effectively used by a prosecutor to harass an accused than

can the imposition of consecutive sentences ....

[It is] solely within

33. The fact that trial courts make errors adverse to the state is demonstrated by
the cases in jurisdictions which permit state appeals. Such jurisdictions generally
provide that an appeal shall be used only for determination of questions of law and
not affect the judgment or bring the defendant back for a new trial. People v. Burke,
47 Cal. 2d 4-5, 301 P.2d 241 (1956) (trial court order striking charge of prior conviction was an appealable order). People v. Gilbert, 25 Cal. 2d 422, 154 P.2d 657
(1944) (an order of the trial court modifying its previous judgment was an order
"affecting substantial rights of the people" and is appealable; State v. Stout, 90 Okla.
35, 210 P.2d 199 (1949) ; State v. Moyers, 86 Okla. 101, 189 P.2d 952 (1948). (If
the question reserved is decided in favor of the state, the appeal settles that question
of law but does not affect the verdict of acquittal.)
While it is objectively important that the law be determined for future cases, a
substantial objection to settling the question of law without affecting the acquittal
is that the criminal law is determined by what amounts to an ex parte procedure.
If the accused does not participate in the appeal, all of the advantages of an
adversary proceeding are lost. Without an opposing faction, an appeal by the state
is not likely to be pursued with any great diligence by the prosecutor. Thus, an
appeal which will only determine the law for future cases may well confuse the
law or even result in an erroneous holding. See Moreland, Modern Criminal Procedure 275 (1959).
34. Horack, supra note 18; State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496, 122 A.2d 628 (1956),
a f'd, 356 U.S. 464 (1958) (four persons were robbed -in a bar; defendant was
acquitted on earlier indictments charging armed robbery of three persons, but was
later convicted of armed robbery of the fourth person).
35. 359 U.S. 187, 199 (1959) (separate opinion).
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the prosecutor's discretion to bring successive prosecutions based on
the same acts, thereby requiring the accused to defend himself more
than once.3 6
If state appeal of error were allowed in such cases, the state might
feel safe in presenting all its claims at one trial. The prosecutor
would not be forced to preserve the state's right to prosecute for
each offense.
The state prosecutor is not the only person at the trial affected
by the rule prohibiting state appeals; the trial judge and defense
counsel are also affected. Trial judges are under pressure to
decide close questions of law in favor of the defendant. This condition is reinforced by the knowledge of the judge that he is safe
from reversal and reprimand by the appellate court if he decides all
close questions of law and doubtful instructions in favor of the
defendant. If the trial results in an acquittal, the record of the
trial is of little or no consequence; if it results in a conviction, the
trial judge is reasonably sure of being affirmed.
If the trial judge makes an error that leads to an acquittal, the
prosecutor has no power to protect the interests of the state.
Objection by the prosecutor to a comment by the judge that is
prejudicial or an instruction that is erroneous will be to no avail
for he cannot appeal.
The prosecutor is also inhibited in his speech and manner of
conducting the trial. The prosecutor's every word is subject to
careful scrutiny by the appellate court as possible reasons for
reversal 38 The prosecutor is thus confined within limits set by the
appellate court as to how far he may go in presenting the state's
case to the jury. The defense counsel, however, may violate all-the
rules of practice and ethics without the fear of having his conduct
form the basis of a reversal by the appellate court.39 Thus, the
36. id. at 199.
37. Recent United States Supreme Court decisions are almost exclusively oriented
toward the rights of the individual without equal consideration being given to the
rights of the public. These decisions have covered all areas of the criminal law.
E.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1963) (defendant's privilege against selfincrimination) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (defendant's right to
counsel) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (suppression of evidence taken during
an unlawful search).
38. State v. Miller, 76 N.M. 62, 412 P.2d 240, 246 (1966) (Comment by prosecutor
which called attention to defendant's failure to testify violated defendant's rights
against self incrimination).
39. While the trial judge and the prosecutor must strive to keep the record free
from error prejudicial to the defendant, "the defense attorney, on the other hand,
can play Texas rules (two below the belt and one above)." Brandenburg, The Right
to Appeal by the State in Criminal Cases, 6 Albuquerque B.J. 10, 12 (June 1966).

APRIL 1967]

COMMENTS

orderly administration of a criminal trial depends in large part
upon the acquiescence of defense counsel.
The benefit of the state appeal is not that the state will take a
large number of appeals, 4 but rather in the care and orderly procedure that it will impose upon the trial. All parties involved would
know that any action on their part would be subject to appellate
review. The quality of practice before the state's criminal courts
would improve. 4 '
Once it is agreed that there are strong reasons why a state should
provide for appeals by the prosecution, there remains the problem
of how this provision can best be made, staying within the constitution 42 and preventing the possibility of abuse. Of course, any statute
would be invalid if it gave the state an appeal after a jury verdict
which was supported by the evidence; this would clearly be double
jeopardy. 43 A good statement of how a state statute might read
appears in the Connecticut statute. 44 The statute provides for
appeals only on questions of law outside the jury's determination.
Thus, the state supreme court could not reverse a verdict of the
jury. The appeal can only test the rulings of the trial court on
matters such as admissibility of evidence, or erroneous instructions.
Moreover, since the permission of the trial judge is required, the
right is discretionary rather than absolute.
Despite the benefits to be gained by allowing the state an appeal
equal to that given the accused, New Mexico would still gain much
if an appeal were allowed the state solely to determine the question
of law involved.4 5 In such an appeal the acquittal is not affected; the
appeal presents a pure question of law for determination. This
would allow the people at least a limited right of appeal. It would
also seem to have the least objection since the appeal would not
40. Miller, supra note 27, at 500. Since Connecticut permits appeals by the state,

Miller examined volumes 82-98 of the Connecticut reports and found the following
results: of 7 appeals by the state, 5 were affirmed and 2 were reversed; of 82
appeals by defendants, 56 were affirmed, 24 were reversed, 1 judgment for the defendant, and 1 appeal dismissed.
41. Horack, Prosecution Appeals in West Virginia, 41 W. Va. L.Q. 50, 56 (1934).
In response to a questionaire sent to the prosecuting attorneys in the state of Virginia,
the replies overwhelmingly expressed the opinion that the granting of the right of
appeal by the state in criminal cases would improve the quality of criminal procedure
and practice in the state. When asked if the state appeal would "restrain unfair
tactics of defense counsel," all but one prosecutor replied affirmatively.
42. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
43. 28 Jour. of Crim. Law 919, 923 (1938).
44. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-96 (Supp. 1965). See text accompanying note 29
supra.

45. See note 33 supra.
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injure the accused once he was acquitted. The fact that the appeal
would be essentially ex parte would not render the question entirely
moot. In spite of the fact that the appellate court would be deciding
the case on the basis of a less than adequate presentation because of
the ex parte nature of the appeal, such an appeal is desirable since
there is a social need for a determination of the law for the future.
While the advantages in procedure which have been increased for
the accused over the years should not be abolished, there should be
an examination to see if the balance is relatively even. A criminal
trial should not be considered final if substantial errors prejudicial
to the prosecution remain uncorrected.
Finality with error is not true finality. The state should have
the opportunity of one correctly judged trial of the defendant for
the offense charged. Correction of material errors, whether prejudicial to the defendant or the state, is necessary to assure a fair and
impartial trial. Finality is essential, but not at the expense of justice.
Although the common law practice of not allowing the state an
appeal in criminal cases is firmly established in New Mexico, 40 it
is recommended that the legislature modernize the state criminal
code by allowing the state an appeal to correct errors in the lower
court proceedings.

Carl J. Schmidt

46. The following cases held that the state has no right of appeal in a
criminal case unless it is conferred by a statute: State v. Ashcroft, 32 N.M. 209, 252
Pac. 1001 (1927) ; State v. Dallas, 22 N.M. 392, 163 Pac. 252 (1917); Ex tarte
Carrillo, 22 N.M. 149, 158 Pac. 800 (1916).

